Introduction and Thesis
On October 22, 1999, the U.N. Security Council in its resolution 1270 established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to succeed the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), which the Council had established fifteen months earlier. For the first time, the Council and the U.N. Secretariat, principally the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), had to formulate mandates and concepts of operations (CONOPS) to confront a power/money based organization that rules through terror with no clearly defined ethnic, clan, political, or ideological agenda.
In May 2000, UN forces came under attack and were nearly routed before the situation was stabilized. The fast growth of the U.N. mission in Sierra Leone from a small team of observers operating under Chapter VI to a large, multi-disciplinary "Chapter 6 ½" peacekeeping operation with complex organizational and logistical requirements was undoubtedly one of the proximate causes of this debacle.
However, a central conclusion of this survey is that although DPKO has demonstrated an improved capacity for organizing forces and formulating rules of engagement (ROE), its CONOPS for Sierra Leone further damaged the U.N.'s already frayed reputation for neutrality and effectiveness. Moreover, the U.N.'s setbacks in Sierra Leone showed that success in executing today's post-Cold War "second generation" peacekeeping operations depends less on coalition building or fielding large numbers of troops than on the deployment of an inner core of trained and adequately equipped contingents under a unified command structure that are supported by militarily competent powers committed to executing an overall political/economic/military strategy.
elections were held as scheduled in 1996, which were won by Ahmed Tjan Kabbah.
Although the election results were rejected by the RUF, negotiations facilitated by Dinka led to a peace agreement known as the Abuja Accord. However, the agreement was derailed in May 1997, when elements of the armed forces, joined by the RUF, overthrew President Kabbah in a military coup that set up a ruling junta, the self-styled "Armed Forces Revolutionary Council" (AFRC). A new Special Envoy, Francis Okelo (Uganda), was appointed, who tried but failed to persuade the AFRC junta to step down. In retrospect, UNOMSIL's CONOPS plan was misconceived. ix Aligning and associating U.N. observers with ECOMOG, a force that had been a party to the conflict, to carry out the DDR program clearly violated the principle of legitimacy and the factor of impartiality.
x Relying on ECOMOG for security and "muscle" to carry out the DDR process not only undermined the neutrality of U.N. observers, but also the legitimacy of the program in the eyes of the RUF and other potentially hostile groups. The CONOPS hinted at these problems, when it cautioned that that unarmed observers under ECOMOG's protection might not be regarded as neutral by hostile forces; that a further expansion of the force might needed; and that future recommendations would depend on ECOMOG's progress in expanding GOSL control of the countryside.
ECOMOG forces proved unable to hold territory or to defend the civilian population from RUF hit-and-run attacks and atrocities, including deliberate maiming.
Not surprisingly, the DDR program stalled along with ECOMOG's operations to bring security to the countryside. Moreover, by allowing the RUF to gain an unexpected advantage, the ECOMOG operation violated the principle of security for peace operations, which subsumes force protection to enhance legitimacy and impartiality, in order to attain international credibility, as well as freedom of movement throughout the area of operations. xi This optic reflected negatively on UNAMSIL.
In December 1998, the RUF launched an offensive to seize control of the government, overrunning most of Freetown. A month later ECOMOG forces, along with AFRC forces now realigned with the GOSL, managed to push the RUF out of the capital, but not before an estimated 5,000 people had lost their lives. In the chaos, UNOMSIL personnel had to be evacuated and the size of the mission downsized.
The Lome Peace Accords and The Transition from UNOMSIL to UNAMSIL
The near success of the RUF offensive, together with the ineffectiveness of the new Sierra Leone Army (SLA) still being trained with British assistance and the growing unwillingness of Nigeria to maintain its troop contribution to ECOMOG, impelled the GOSL to seek a settlement with the RUF. On May 24, 1999, the parties agreed to a ceasefire, and on July 7, 1999, signed the Lome Peace Accords that provided for RUF participation in a government of national unity, amnesty, and an expanded DDR program under U.N. and ECOMOG auspices to disarm and demobilize an estimated 45,000
"former combatants," among the RUF, the AFRC, and village militias known as Civil None of these steps, as we shall see, were implemented effectively.
UNAMSIL's Faulty Assumptions
A close reading of the CONOPS shows that its adequacy and feasibility were predicated on three assumptions. First, the expanded force would be operating in a permissive Chapter VI environment, in which all parties would do their part in the peace process --although the report notes with concern the failure of RUF leader Sankoh and others to assume their duties in the government of national unity. xviii Secondly, the CONOPS assumed that ECOMOG forces would remain in Sierra Leone with sufficient strength to maintain security in the Freetown and the Lungi peninsulas, to provide security at DDR sites, and to undertake operations against "rogue elements unwilling to participate in the peace process." xix Thirdly, it was assumed that Liberia would honor its assurances to support the Lome process and to participate in a regional Joint Security
Committee to stop diamond smuggling, the flow of arms, and cross-border incursions.
The CONOPS did not address how the amnesty provisions of Lome could be reconciled with its human rights provisions and the issue of war crimes. The report merely noted that the nature of a proposed truth and reconciliation commission had generated "intense debate." xx On the plus side, the CONOPS did integrate an economic dimension by calling for a trust fund, targeted at $40 million, to be administered by the World Bank, to offer former combatants stipends, retraining, and other incentives to make the DDR process work.
Neither the CONOPS nor the larger report defined an objective or a desired endstate under which the mandate would come to an end. A possible milestone might have been fulfillment of the task to provide support in the election scheduled for 2001 or the training and certification of the SLA by the British military mission. xxi Instead, the CONOPS promised periodic reviews and incremental withdrawals "by one, or even two battalions, as the process unfolds and the security situation improves." xxii Nevertheless, the CONOPS warned that in the eventuality of a withdrawal of ECOMOG forces remaining in country, "a much stronger U.N. force of about 10 infantry battalions would be required and contingency planning would keep this possible scenario in view." xxiii This last proviso really amounted to a recipe for "mission creep" from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII operation, given ECOMOG's much stronger ROE.
Departure of ECOMOG; Size of UNAMSIL Doubled
After failing to collect subsides from donors to continue their operations in were opposed to a tougher mandate, fearing it would expose their troops in Sierra Leone to attacks from the RUF. xxxii DPKO recommended that the additional deployments take place in secure areas to restore a degree of "normalcy" and confidence to resume the DDR process, which had enrolled 24,000 participants and collected 10,840 weapons On August 4, the Security Council adopted resolution 1313, which, rather than selecting any of the options noted above, identified a series of highly operational "priority tasks" whose fulfillment were deemed critical for the success of the mission. The
Secretary General and DPKO were asked to make recommendations to enable UNAMSIL "to maintain the security of the Lungi and Freetown peninsulas, and their major approach routes," "to deploy progressively and in a coherent manner and with sufficient numbers and density at key strategic location and population centers," "to assist the GOSL to extend state authority and further stabilize the situation progressively throughout the county," "to patrol actively on strategic lines of communications, specifically main access routes to the capital in order to dominate ground [sic ] , and ensure freedom of movement," and "to deter and decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile action or threat of imminent and direct use of force." xl The Alternate U.S. Representative explained that the Council had taken "an historic step by insisting on task-driven planning" to identify tasks and objectives before the Council decided on troop level or resources to ensure the mission's success. 
DPKO's Task-Driven CONOPS for UNAMSIL; The Indians and Jordanians Balk
On August 24, 2000, in his sixth report to the Council, the Secretary General responded to the tasking under resolution 1313 with a revised CONOPS. The plan, prepared by DPKO, called for an augmentation of the force to 20,500. The mode of operation was "progressive forward deployment accompanied by coordinated political steps, involving the GOSL, ECOWAS, and the U.N., as well as public information campaign" to encourage the RUF to disarm and transform itself into a genuine political party. xliii In the first phase, two infantry battalions would be deployed along with a number of force multipliers assigned to each sector of the operation, including logistics, communications, helicopter transportation, air-ground coordination units, intelligence, and electronic operations units. In the second phase, an additional three battalions and an augmentation of the force to 20,500 military personnel would be required to undertake eastward deployments into RUF-held territories in conjunction with increased political and economic pressures. xliv In all phases, special equipment "not usually associated with peacekeeping operations" would be required, such as equipment for surveillance and target acquisition, in some cases with night and all weather capability. The concept also relied on a combination of political and military instruments to extend GOSL authority, restore security throughout the country, and assist in the promotion of a political process to renew the DDR program.
The Secretary General also hinted at problems with troop contributors. In his consultations, all indicated concerns that the CONOPS "would demand a very strong force with the necessary force multipliers." Most stressed that "that they could not be expected to take part in peace enforcement operations." xlv However, action to authorize an increase in troop levels was delayed, when India announced the withdrawal of its 3,000-man contingent, probably the most competent and professional contingent in the force, after the Secretary General had requested New Delhi to replace Major General Jetley as the force commander. xlvi The Indian decision followed months of friction between Jetley and Nigerian Brigadier General Garba, in which Jetley accused Garba of collaborating with the RUF and undermining the peace process in order to profiteer from the illegal diamond trade. xlvii Press reports indicate that the Indians were also annoyed that British troops operating in Sierra Leone had not been put under U.N. command. xlviii A few weeks later, the Jordanians followed suit and announced that they would be pulling out their 1,800-man contingent, partly because no NATO country had agreed to participate in the mission. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
By this exhaustive and incremental process, UNAMSIL today, at a cost of $1.5 million per day, is the U.N.'s largest, most complex, and, potentially, most hazardous peacekeeping operation. Its success or failure in dealing with the criminality and rapacity of the RUF in looting the natural resources of Sierra Leone may well decide the Security Council's approach to similar situations in Zaire and Angola, countries with far greater natural resources and implications for U.S. and Western interests, and with far larger operational areas and potential costs than UNAMSIL.
In trying to sum up the lessons learned from UNAMSIL's humiliation at the hands of the RUF, Special Representative Adeniji said in a press interview, "We have come to realize that the sedate atmosphere for classic peacekeeping didn't exist and doesn't exist. We misjudged fundamentally in the way we deployed. We were easy targets." lv Perhaps, this is true, but as noted in resolution 1313, the RUF offensive also "revealed serious inherent weaknesses in the mission's structure, command and control, and resources [and] that successful achievement of the objectives of the mission [would] depend on the provision of fully equipped, complete units with effective command and control structure and capacity, a single chain of command, adequate resources, and commitment to implement the mandate." In retrospect, UNOMSIL's CONOPS plan was misconceived. lxviii Aligning and associating U.N. observers with ECOMOG, a force that had been a party to the conflict, to carry out the DDR program clearly violated the principle of legitimacy and the factor of impartiality. lxix Relying on ECOMOG for security and "muscle" to carry out the DDR process not only undermined the neutrality of U.N. observers, but also the legitimacy of the program in the eyes of the RUF and other potentially hostile groups. The CONOPS hinted at these problems, when it cautioned that that unarmed observers under ECOMOG's protection might not be regarded as neutral by hostile forces; that a further expansion of the force might needed; and that future recommendations would depend on ECOMOG's progress in expanding GOSL control of the countryside.
Not surprisingly, the DDR program stalled along with ECOMOG's operations to bring security to the countryside. Moreover, by allowing the RUF to gain an unexpected advantage, the ECOMOG operation violated the principle of security for peace operations, which subsumes force protection to enhance legitimacy and impartiality, in order to attain international credibility, as well as freedom of movement throughout the area of operations. lxx This optic reflected negatively on UNAMSIL.
In December 1998, the RUF launched an offensive to seize control of the government, overrunning most of Freetown. A month later ECOMOG forces, along with AFRC forces now realigned with the GOSL, managed to push the RUF out of the capital, but not before an estimated 5,000 people had lost their lives. In the chaos, UNOMSIL personnel had to be evacuated and the size of the mission downsized. as "blue helmets." lxxiv It was hoped that UNAMSIL would thereby "derive maximum benefit from the experience acquired by ECOMOG on the ground." lxxv To ensure effective command and control, the concept also called for one of the troop contributing countries to establish a "core force" headquarters, as well as "a joint operations centers with ECOMOG at headquarters and, if necessary, also at the subordinate levels in the field." lxxvi None of these steps, as we shall see, were implemented effectively.
UNAMSIL's Faulty Assumptions
A close reading of the CONOPS shows that its adequacy and feasibility were predicated on three assumptions. First, the expanded force would be operating in a permissive Chapter VI environment, in which all parties would do their part in the peace process --although the report notes with concern the failure of RUF leader Sankoh and others to assume their duties in the government of national unity. lxxvii Secondly, the CONOPS assumed that ECOMOG forces would remain in Sierra Leone with sufficient strength to maintain security in the Freetown and the Lungi peninsulas, to provide security at DDR sites, and to undertake operations against "rogue elements unwilling to participate in the peace process." lxxviii Thirdly, it was assumed that Liberia would honor its assurances to support the Lome process and to participate in a regional Joint Security
The CONOPS did not address how the amnesty provisions of Lome could be reconciled with its human rights provisions and the issue of war crimes. The report merely noted that the nature of a proposed truth and reconciliation commission had generated "intense debate." lxxix On the plus side, the CONOPS did integrate an economic dimension by calling for a trust fund, targeted at $40 million, to be administered by the World Bank, to offer former combatants stipends, retraining, and other incentives to make the DDR process work.
Neither the CONOPS nor the larger report defined an objective or a desired endstate under which the mandate would come to an end. A possible milestone might have been fulfillment of the task to provide support in the election scheduled for 2001 or the training and certification of the SLA by the British military mission. lxxx Instead, the CONOPS promised periodic reviews and incremental withdrawals "by one, or even two battalions, as the process unfolds and the security situation improves." lxxxi Nevertheless, the CONOPS warned that in the eventuality of a withdrawal of ECOMOG forces remaining in country, "a much stronger U.N. force of about 10 infantry battalions would be required and contingency planning would keep this possible scenario in view." lxxxii This last proviso really amounted to a recipe for "mission creep" from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII operation, given ECOMOG's much stronger ROE.
Departure of ECOMOG; Size of UNAMSIL Doubled
After failing to collect subsides from donors to continue their operations in were either released or rescued, in some cases through the good offices of Liberian President Taylor, it was clear that the Lome process had broken down and that UNAMSIL was no longer operating in a permissive Chapter VI environment.
Post Mortems and Recommendations to Stabilize the Situation
Although the CONOPS plan suggested that not all parties might view ECOMOG as neutral, one of its implicit assumptions was that UNAMSIL enjoyed that distinction.
Although the CONOPS plan anticipated that "rogue elements" might mount attacks, there does not seem to have been any planning to establish a structure of intelligence or On August 4, the Security Council adopted resolution 1313, which, rather than selecting any of the options noted above, identified a series of highly operational "priority tasks" whose fulfillment were deemed critical for the success of the mission. The
Secretary General and DPKO were asked to make recommendations to enable UNAMSIL "to maintain the security of the Lungi and Freetown peninsulas, and their major approach routes," "to deploy progressively and in a coherent manner and with sufficient numbers and density at key strategic location and population centers," "to assist the GOSL to extend state authority and further stabilize the situation progressively throughout the county," "to patrol actively on strategic lines of communications, specifically main access routes to the capital in order to dominate ground [sic ] , and ensure freedom of movement," and "to deter and decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile action or threat of imminent and direct use of force." xcix The Alternate U.S. Representative explained that the Council had taken "an historic step by insisting on task-driven planning" to identify tasks and objectives before the Council decided on troop level or resources to ensure the mission's success. command. cvii A few weeks later, the Jordanians followed suit and announced that they would be pulling out their 1,800-man contingent, partly because no NATO country had agreed to participate in the mission. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
In trying to sum up the lessons learned from UNAMSIL's humiliation at the hands of the RUF, Special Representative Adeniji said in a press interview, "We have come to realize that the sedate atmosphere for classic peacekeeping didn't exist and doesn't exist. We misjudged fundamentally in the way we deployed. We were easy targets." cxiv Perhaps, this is true, but as noted in resolution 1313, the RUF offensive also "revealed serious inherent weaknesses in the mission's structure, command and control, and resources [and] that successful achievement of the objectives of the mission [would] depend on the provision of fully equipped, complete units with effective command and control structure and capacity, a single chain of command, adequate resources, and commitment to implement the mandate." cxv Resolution 1313, although open to criticism for setting a precedent for policymakers to micromanage operations, sought to provide a roadmap for a revised CONOPS to correct these deficiencies. The Council's insistence on "task-driven planning" to set troop levels and allocate resources is a novel approach, which raises interesting questions as to a possible future role for the long-dormant Military Staff
Committee to assist the Council in this endeavor. cxvi DPKO's product, as endorsed in resolution 1346 and drafted to reflect the Council's carefully balanced consensus, seeks not to defeat the RUF militarily, but rather to create conditions on the ground, both military and political, that would induce a power shift in favor of moderate elements in the RUF willing to participate in the peace process on the basis of Lome. Nevertheless, the situation remains precarious, and there is no guarantee that the RUF will buy into the DDR and Lome processes. UNAMSIL may have to score some real operational successes to exact sufficient costs to convince the RUF leadership to cooperate. For this overall strategy to succeed, all the Council's instruments of power will have to brought to bear in coordination with UNAMSIL's efforts on the ground, including, the World Bank's DDR incentives program, economic sanctions on Liberia to isolate the RUF, as well as, the diplomacy of the Special Representative and others to co-opt the RUF.
Continued engagement by the U.S. and the United Kingdom also will be required. 
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